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I. INTRODUCTION
Is it rational to do something that you have no reason to do? Let us
press the point: Could it be rational to do something that, on balance,
you have reason not to do? On the view that practical rationality simply
is acting for reasons, this would appear to be impossible. If there is no
space between what you ought rationally to do and what reasons tell you
to do, then the possibility of acting rationally, but contrary to the balance
of reasons, is closed off. Thus, John Gardner and Timothy Macklem
conclude their recent analysis of this topic: “rationality . . . is simply the
capacity and propensity to act (think, feel, etc.) only and always for
undefeated reasons.”1
* Faculty of Law, University of Toronto, bruce.chapman@utoronto.ca. The
Author is grateful to Shachar Lifshitz, Joe Mintoff, Oren Perez, and Wlodek Rabinowicz
for comments on an earlier draft.
1. John Gardner & Timothy Macklem, Reasons, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
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The theory of rational choice also seems to have this view about how
reasons relate, structurally, to rational conduct, although it is not a
theory that devotes much effort to analyzing reasons as such. According
to rational choice theory, reasons (which, it should be emphasized, may
be self-interested or other-regarding, consequentialist or deontological,
objective or subjective) ultimately give rise to a preference for doing x
rather than y, and rational choice consists in following that preference. It
would be irrational, in other words, to act contrary to a preference, or
contrary to the reason that lies behind it. Now, this idea does commit
the rational choice theorist to requiring something else, namely, that the
preference relation, which is essentially binary, satisfy certain minimal
consistency conditions when more than two alternative choices are
involved. For example, the preference relation must be transitive, or at
least not cyclical.2 For if an agent, for whatever reason, preferred x to y,
y to z, and z to x, then it would not be possible for the agent to choose
any of these three alternatives without choosing contrary to some
preference or the requirements of some reason. Thus, the basis for
imposing this formal condition of rationality, one that appears to connect
different possible choices, is really only to meet the same fundamental
concern identified by many theorists as essential to rationality, namely,
that in every choice an agent must act only and always for undefeated
reasons.
However, if practical rationality consists of something more than
acting for reasons, then it might be possible, rationally, to do something
that you have no reason to do, or even that you have reason not to do.
Suppose, for example, that practical rationality, at least in part, consisted
of doing what “makes sense,” a point recently suggested by David
Velleman.3 An action that does not make sense certainly looks like it
JURISPRUDENCE AND PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 440, 474 (Jules Coleman & Scott Shapiro eds.,
2002) (emphasis added). We should be careful in our interpretation of this summary that
Gardner and Macklem provide of their position on rationality and reasons. For example,
for them, rationality goes only to a general capacity, not a particular action. Thus, it may
not be that an action itself must accord with reasons if it is to be rational. Further, in
their view, reason-based choice need not be choice consciously guided by reason. They
provide examples of this being counterproductive. Nevertheless, theirs is an analysis of
rationality that does put reasons at the center. For another prominent theorist of rational
decisionmaking who seems to collapse rationality into action according to reasons, see
JOSEPH RAZ, ENGAGING REASON 1 (1999) (“Being rational is being capable of acting
intentionally, that is, for reasons . . . .”). See also id. at 68 (“An account of rationality is
an account of the capacity to perceive reasons and to conform to them . . . .”). Of course,
Raz is also well known for allowing the possibility that rational choice can be choice
when certain (sorts of) reasons for action are excluded. See his discussion of
exclusionary reasons in JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON AND NORMS 35–48 (1975).
2. AMARTYA K. SEN, COLLECTIVE CHOICE AND SOCIAL WELFARE 16 (1970).
3. See J. David Velleman, The Self as Narrator, available at http://wwwpersonal.umich.edu/~velleman/Work/Dennett.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2005); J. David
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might be a promising candidate for irrationality. Velleman seems to
have in mind the idea that some actions might make less sense than
others (or not make sense at all) for an agent because they are less
coherent with other actions that the agent has already chosen. The
agent’s life, or at least this part of the agent’s life, would hang together
less well as a coherent narrative for the agent if these misaligned actions
were now the ones that the agent chose to perform. Of course,
independent of the prior narrative, there may be every reason to do these
misaligned actions, and no reason not to. But it is Velleman’s view that
the agent, as narrator of a coherent life, will—sometimes, at least—feel
the rational pull of these prior actions. Therefore, it seems possible that,
at these later moments of choice, an agent could rationally do what she
has no reason to do, and even, perhaps, what (on balance) she has reason
not to do.
It will be objected, of course, that the agent’s prior decisions and
choices simply provide reasons for the agent to carry on in a way that is
coherent with them. Thus, Velleman’s account of practical rationality is
not at all inconsistent with the account that reduces rationality to acting
for (undefeated) reasons. But, as some recent work by John Broome
makes clear,4 this objection confuses reasons with the normative
requirements of practical rationality. Unlike reasons, the normative
requirements of practical rationality do not detach from the elements
they hold together (for example, a series of decisions). Thus, they do not
give you reason to have any one of those elements (or make any one
decision) in particular. They only require that if you have one of those
elements, then you must have some other one on pain of irrationality if
you do not.
This difference between reasons and the normative requirements of
Velleman, Narrative Explanation, available at http://www-personal.umich.edu/~velleman/
Work/narrative.pdf (last visited Mar. 2, 2005).
4. John Broome, Normative Requirements, 12 RATIO 398 (1999) [hereinafter
Broome, Requirements]; John Broome, Are Intentions Reasons? And How Should We
Cope with Incommensurable Values?, in PRACTICAL RATIONALITY AND PREFERENCE 98,
98–120 (Christopher W. Morris & Arthur Ripstein eds., 2001) [hereinafter Broome, Are
Intentions Reasons?]; John Broome & Christian Piller, Normative Practical Reasoning,
in Supp. 75 T HE A RISTOTELIAN S OCIETY 175, 175–93 (2001) [hereinafter Broome,
Normative]; John Broome, Practical Reasoning, in REASON AND NATURE 85, 85–111
(José Luis Bermúdez & Alan Millar eds., 2002) [hereinafter Broome, Practical
Reasoning]; John Broome, Reasons, in REASON AND VALUE: ESSAYS ON THE MORAL
PHILOSOPHY OF JOSEPH RAZ (R. Jay Wallace et al. eds., forthcoming 2005) [hereinafter
Broome, Reasons].

93

CHAPMAN

4/7/2005 10:07 AM

practical rationality is crucially important for what practical rationality
can achieve. For only if the different reasons for action can be separated
from each other by something that is itself not a reason, but is
nevertheless a normative requirement of practical rationality, will it be
rationally possible for an agent to follow through on rational commitments,
rationally made. This, we shall see, is a source of great advantage for an
agent, although securing this advantage cannot be the agent’s reason for
action. Thus, the agent must secure the advantage rationally, but without
reason.
This Article develops this argument more fully as follows. Part II
begins by distinguishing reasons from reasoning, and introduces the
possibility of having a reason to choose to do something that you have
reason not to do. This possibility is related to some quite conventional
problems that the rational choice theorist faces in the theory of rational
commitment. As we shall see, these problems arise because the rational
choice theorist reduces practical rationality to action according to reason.
Part III argues that practical rationality, in addition to requiring that
action accord with reasons, also requires that action meet certain
normative requirements and outlines the logical difference between the
two. It argues that the special conceptual space that is occupied by
normative requirements prevents the different reasons that animate
distinct moments of decisionmaking from collapsing into one another to
the disadvantage of the agent. Again, the analysis, at this point, is
related to the special difficulty of rational commitment that confronts the
rational choice theorist. In Part IV, I argue that the more robust model
of rational commitment that is made possible by the idea of normative
requirements of practical rationality should be familiar to legal theorists.
After all, it is an idea manifested constantly in common law decisionmaking,
where defeasible legal rules both determine cases (as a matter of
normative requirement) and are determined by them (as a matter of
reason), apparently simultaneously. Thus, the distinction between reasons
and normative requirements of practical rationality can be used both to
prescribe a solution for a problem in rational choice—namely, the
problem of rational commitment—and to provide structural understanding
for what is rational in legal reason and the method of common law
adjudication. Part V provides some concluding remarks.
II. REASONING, REASONS, AND RATIONAL COMMITMENTS
All reasoning starts from an existing state of mind and concludes in a
new one.5 Theoretical reasoning, for example, takes us from one beginning
5.
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state of belief to another. If you begin by believing that Frankfurt is in
Germany and Germany is in Europe, then theoretical reason would have
you conclude by believing that Frankfurt is in Europe.
Practical reasoning is said to differ from theoretical reasoning in that,
while it might proceed partially by way of beliefs, it concludes in an action
rather than a belief. But that is not quite right.6 An action (at least a
physical action) requires physical ability as well as the ability to reason.
More generally, we might say that an action requires opportunity. Thus,
the most that practical reasoning can do is to take us from some existing
state of mind to a decision or an intention to act—that is, another state of
mind, albeit not one of mere belief. The action itself is something that
carries out that decision or intention and lies beyond what reasoning alone
can do for us.
This separation between what we decide or intend to do and what we
actually do seems to allow for the following interesting question: Can we
have reason to decide or intend to do something that we have no reason
actually to do? Notice that this is not the same question with which this
Article began. There the contrast was between what rationality and reasons
might demand of us; here it is between what reasons themselves might
demand of us at the two moments in a decision process that are opened up
by the possibility that practical reasoning can only conclude in a state of
mind (say, an intention) that falls short of an action.
It should be clear to any rational choice theorist who has anguished over
the problem of rational commitment that we can have reasons to decide or
intend to do something that we have no reason actually to do. More
strongly, it seems that we can have reasons to decide or intend to do
something that we have reason not to do. Indeed, more specifically, we
can have reason R to decide to do something that we have reason R not to
do. In other words, the same reason R can provide a rational basis both for
choosing to do x and for not actually doing it.
A familiar and problematic example includes my promising someone to
do x in exchange for that person doing y (where my promise is sincere at
the time I make it) and yet, just as rationally, not doing x when the time
comes to execute on the promise after the other party has done y. The
reason for me to promise to do x is that I am better off with y being done
(even after I incur the costs of doing x), and my promise helps to
accomplish that; the reason not to do x is that I am (again) better off not
6.

Id. at 85.
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doing something that it is costly for me to do if there is no further benefit to
be secured by actually doing it. Similarly, there can be self-interested
reasons for me to threaten to do x should others do y, but (again) the same
self-interested reasons not to actually do x when (despite my threat) they do
y. Again, the reason to make the threat is that I am better off if they do not
do y, and my threat helps to accomplish that; but I may be better off
actually not to carry out my threat if they do y.
This much points to a kind of dynamic inconsistency7 in the reasons that
we can have at different moments within a single decision process. But
more striking than the inconsistency itself is the manner in which the
rational choice theorist resolves the inconsistency. An inconsistency
between two apparently conflicting reasons can be resolved by relaxing the
force of one or the other, and nothing in the argument so far points us to
any particular resolution in this respect. However, as we shall now see, the
rational choice theorist is inclined to give a priority to the reasons that
agents have for particular choices over the reasons they might have had for
a broader set of (more categorical) commitments.8 This, I suggest, follows
from combining (1) the idea, familiar by now, that rational action is action
according to reasons with (2) a mode of reasoning that is essentially
inductive—that is, that begins with the rationality of a particular choice
and, with that choice in place, goes on to build an understanding of more
general rationality requirements as an aggregation of similar such choices.
What is rational for the general category, therefore, is built out of what is
rational for the particular case. This inductive buildup from the particular
to the general has the effect, I will argue, of displacing from our
understanding of practical rationality anything that is different from, and
which begins at a more general level than, the rationality of a particular
action as one done in accordance with a reason. In other words, inductive
reasoning helps to fill in all of practical rationality with action done
according to particular reasons. Thus, it displaces from practical rationality
the very possibility of having anything that is conceptually distinct from
reasons, such as normative requirements.
To see how this works, consider again the example of promising. As we
have seen, the rational choice theorist is committed to the general idea that
practical rationality consists in acting according to reasons. Of course, for
7. R.H. Strotz, Myopia and Inconsistency in Dynamic Utility Maximization, 23 REV.
ECON. STUD. 165–80 (1955–1956); Peter J. Hammond, Changing Tastes and Coherent
Dynamic Choice, 43 REV. OF ECON. STUD. 159–73 (1976). For a philosopher’s discussion, see
generally EDWARD F. MCCLENNEN, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE (1990).
8. For further discussion of the “particularity” of rational choice theory, and how
this approach contrasts with the more “categorical” approach that characterizes an
alternative tradition of rationality, see Bruce Chapman, Rational Choice and Categorical
Reason, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1169, 1169–210 (2002).
OF
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the rational choice theorist, reasons come mediated by preferences, and
preferences must be transitive (or at least acyclic) if the idea of acting
according to reasons is to be generally realized. But this does not alter the
basic point that rational choice cannot be choice contrary to an undefeated
reason. Thus, in the context of promises, it cannot be rational to carry out
the promise if to do so at the time is contrary to preference or reason. Now,
this much allows us to know what the promisor might do having already
made the promise. But the rational choice theorist also has a way of
determining what the promisor will choose to do at the prior moment when
it is possible to make the promise. As this situation has an interpersonal
aspect, this argument appears to require that the rational choice theorist
make a fairly sophisticated assumption about what the promisor knows or
believes about the promisee and, more particularly, about what the
promisor knows or believes about what the promisee knows or believes
about the promisor. Specifically, in these situations, the rational choice
theorist assumes not only that all agents are rational, in the sense that they
choose according to preference (and reason), but also that there is common
knowledge of this rationality—namely, that each player knows that each
is rational, and, further, that each knows that each knows this, and that
each knows that each knows that each knows this, and so on. Exactly
how sophisticated this last assumption is, and how, by way of induction, it
helps the rational choice theorist to resolve the problem of dynamic
inconsistency, can better be seen with the help of a more detailed example.
Imagine the following situation, which rational choice theorists
commonly refer to as a “centipede game.”9 The bank has put out one
hundred coins on a table. Two players, Art and Bart, are to take turns
removing either one or two coins from the table, each keeping all the
9. This game seems to originate with Robert W. Rosenthal, Games of Perfect
Information, Predatory Pricing and the Chain-Store Paradox, 25 J. ECON. THEORY 92,
92–100 (1981). For a detailed discussion of the game which reproduces some of the
analysis presented here, see Bruce Chapman, Legal Analysis of Economics: Solving the
Problem of Rational Commitment, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 471, 475–82 (2004). For other
recent discussion, see Robert J. Aumann, Note, On the Centipede Game, 23 GAMES &
ECON. BEHAV. 97, 97–105 (1998); John Broome & Wlodek Rabinowicz, Backwards
Induction in the Centipede Game, 59 ANALYSIS 237, 237–42 (1999); Wlodek
Rabinowicz, Grappling with the Centipede: Defence of Backward Induction for BiTerminating Games, 14 ECON. & PHIL. 95, 95–126 (1998). The term “centipede” is used
because when the game is represented as a decision tree (in extensive form), the tree
consists of a long horizontal line segment (representing the players moving through the
game as they take only one coin) with many short downward lines (representing the
player taking two coins and ending the game at that point), i.e., a picture of a long
centipede with many short legs.
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coins that he removes. The game stops as soon as either player removes
two coins, and at that point all the coins (and only those coins) still
remaining on the table are returned to the bank. However, so long as
each player takes only one coin, the game continues until all the coins
are removed. Potentially, therefore, each player could take one coin at
each turn and end up with fifty coins.
We are to imagine that Art and Bart are both rational in the sense that
each wants to maximize his own monetary payoff from playing the
game. Thus, each will not choose an option, or develop a strategy, if
there is some other option or strategy that he could choose that will give
him more money. Moreover, this rationality is common knowledge in
the game in the way described above.
Suppose Art has the first move. The rational choice theorist’s standard
argument, based on backwards induction, is that Art will rationally
choose to take two coins and the game will end. Of course, this seems a
little problematic, even for Art; he might like to think that the game
could have gone on a little longer so that he (and, incidentally, Bart too)
could have picked up a few more of the one hundred coins that were
available. But, unfortunately, that thought has no survival value under
the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge of rationality.
To see why, imagine Art thinking ahead to where there are only two
coins left on the table. This means that, up to this point in the game,
each player has taken only one coin and has forty-nine in his possession.
But now Art can either end the game by taking the two coins that remain
or take only one and allow the game to end with Bart taking the only
coin that is left. Clearly, the first option provides a higher payoff for Art
and, therefore, is the rational option for him. So that is the option he
chooses on this play of the game and the game ends.
But now consider Bart thinking ahead to where there are three coins
on the table—that is, to the penultimate play in the game just before the
one imagined by Art in the previous paragraph.10 Since, under the
assumption of common knowledge of rationality, Bart knows that Art is
rational, he knows what Art will do in the next play of the game should
Bart choose only one coin and the game move on to that next (and
ultimate) stage. But Bart can do better than that by taking two coins at
this penultimate play, thereby stopping the game. So, being rational,
that is what Bart chooses to do.11
10. Or, more accurately, consider Art thinking this about Bart. For all of this
thinking is really going to an explanation of why Art, who has the first move in the
game, will choose to take two coins on the first move. So it is really a question of what
Art is thinking about what Bart is thinking (about what Art is thinking, etc.). All this is
made possible by common knowledge of rationality.
11. There is of course a problem here that more than a few commentators have

98

CHAPMAN

[VOL. 42: 91, 2005]

4/7/2005 10:07 AM

Rational Commitment and Legal Reason
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

Now, of course, this last choice by Bart is perfectly predictable by Art
(again, given common knowledge of rationality), and so Art will
anticipate at the pre-penultimate play of the game, when there are four
coins still on the table, that Bart will end the game at the next
penultimate play. So, given that he is rational, Art will choose to do
better by taking two coins rather than one at this pre-penultimate point,
thus ending the game. And so on. We must conclude, therefore, that
under this sort of inductive reasoning, and these assumptions, the game
will end on the first play when Art takes two coins, leaving the other
ninety-eight to be returned to the bank.
Does anything change if each player, at the beginning of the game,
promises the other to only take one coin throughout the game? We can
certainly see that each player has a reason for wishing that he could
make such a sincere and credible promise (i.e., a promise that the other
player could rationally believe). After all, each would be so much better
off if, by promising, each could induce the other to behave according to
their respective promises; each would have fifty coins rather than Art
having two and Bart having none. But the backwards induction
argument, based on the assumptions that each player is rational and that
this rationality is common knowledge, prevents the promise from being
noticed. For the players to reach this point in the game, where there are only three coins
remaining on the table, each player must have chosen not to terminate the game; that is,
each must have chosen to remove only one coin at all the prior turns. But, as the
backwards induction argument goes on to show (under the assumptions of rationality and
common knowledge of rationality, assumptions that the players themselves can use to
generate the argument), to remove only one coin on one’s turn is not rational. Thus, at
the point when there are only three remaining coins on the table, for Bart to hypothesize
that Art will remove two coins on his next move (should Bart take only one coin and
allow the game to continue on to that next move) is for Bart to hypothesize that Art is
rational on this next move even though, also by hypothesis, Art has shown no such
rationality in the game so far. Is it plausible for Bart to have, or to hypothesize having,
such a resilient (i.e., contrary to fact) belief in Art’s rationality? Indeed, is it plausible
for Bart to anticipate acting rationally on his own turn having himself acted irrationally
in the game so far? More generally, is it plausible to argue or hypothesize, at any turn in
the game, that the player (whose turn it is) will either act rationally at this turn, or believe
the other player will act rationally on the next turn, if this turn could not have been
reached except through irrational play either by himself or the other player (or both) at
some point earlier in the game? For good discussion of this difficulty in the backwards
induction argument, see Philip Pettit & Robert Sugden, The Backward Induction
Paradox, 86 J. PHIL. 169, 169–82 (1989). For a reconstruction of the argument that
cleverly avoids this problem, at least at a formal level (by building in the assumption that
all players believe that any turn in the game, if it is actually reached, must have been
reached only by way of rational choices), see Broome & Rabinowicz, supra note 9, at
238–39. Also, for a similar argument, see Aumann, supra note 9, at 103.
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credible. Each player knows, under these assumptions and regardless of
what has been promised by the other player, that it is rational for the
other player to end the game on the next move should he, himself,
choose, according to his promise, not to end the game by only taking one
coin. Thus, it is pointless for each player to believe the other’s promise,
and just as pointless, therefore, for each player to make it.
The rational choice theorist, therefore, resolves the dynamic inconsistency
of having a reason to make a sincere promise that one has no reason to
perform by denying the feasibility of making such a promise at all.12
Without any real opportunity to make such a promise, there is nothing to
which reason can attach. And, therefore, there is nothing to which a
reason for not performing the promise can attach either. Now, by
obliterating both of the inconsistent elements that make it up, this might
appear more to dissolve the possibility of dynamic inconsistency
altogether, rather than resolve it in some particular way by privileging
one of the inconsistent elements. But it is clear from seeing how the
backwards induction argument actually works that the dissolution is
driven by (1) beginning with the reason that attaches to removing two
coins at any particular choice in the game, particularly the last possible
choice, (2) holding constant to the rationality of that choice (and each
player’s knowledge of its rationality) as one considers other prior
choices, and then (3) generalizing to all prior (like) choices the same
rationality that requires the agent to choose according to reason on the
last possible choice. Thus, the dissolution of the dynamic inconsistency
is clearly based on privileging the reason that attaches to not performing
the promise, showing then (under the common knowledge assumption)
that the prior making of the promise is without reason, and, only then,
showing that there is nothing to which the reason for nonperformance
can actually attach. This effectively resolves the dynamic inconsistency
by privileging the reason not to perform the promise over the reason that
one originally had to make it.
Because, under the assumptions of rationality and common knowledge
of rationality, the players do so much worse for themselves as compared
to how they might otherwise have done, the backwards induction
argument has been thought to be somewhat paradoxical.13 Apparently
acceptable assumptions, combined with an apparently acceptable
argument, have led us to an apparently unacceptable conclusion in terms
12. MCCLENNEN, supra note 7, at 200–18.
13. Even prominent game theorists concede this. See Reinhard Selten, The Chain
Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DECISION 127, 138 (1978) (arguing that the backwards
induction argument provides a “game theoretically correct” answer for how rationally to
play the game, but conceding that other ways of playing seem “to be the better guide to
practical behavior”).
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of the payoffs that individually rational players secure. Moreover, there
seems every reason to think that, in fact, two rational players in such a
game would not actually play the game in the way that the backwards
induction argument suggests. To accommodate this last point, the
rational choice theorist’s typical response has been to change the
common knowledge of rationality assumption.14 That is, we will see the
players play this game longer, and more profitably, the argument goes,
because it cannot be assumed that each player knows that each player is
rational, or that each knows that each knows that each is rational, etc.
This change in the common knowledge of rationality assumption will
allow Art (or Bart) to entertain, at least, the thought that at some point in
the game he should take only one coin because the other player will not
necessarily respond by taking two coins and end the game in the next
round of play. Predicting at what point exactly the game might end
depends on the precise details of how the common knowledge
assumption is relaxed, and need not detain us here. The important point
is that a relaxation of this assumption allows us to comprehend the
thought that the players might play the game more profitably than they
do under the strictest version of the backwards induction argument that
is implied by assuming common knowledge of rationality.
Moreover, as an empirical matter, it does seem implausible to think
that the players would actually have common knowledge of rationality.
After all, such an assumption requires each player to know a great deal
about the other player’s rationality and, further, about the other player’s
knowledge about one’s own rationality. Indeed, it requires a player to
know about the other player’s knowledge about one’s own knowledge
about that player’s rationality (and so on)! As the demands of common
knowledge grow through these different levels, the assumption that there
could actually be the sort of interpersonal transparency that is required
seems more and more strained. And so, it seems reasonable to the
rational choice theorist to relax the common knowledge of rationality
assumption.15
14. See, e.g., David M. Kreps et al., Rational Cooperation in the Finitely Repeated
Prisoners’ Dilemma, 27 J. ECON. THEORY 245, 246 (1982) (“[W]e are able to show that
certain kinds of informational asymmetries must yield a significant measure of
cooperation in equilibrium, and that other plausible asymmetries may produce
cooperation as well.”).
15. The economist seeks to relax the common knowledge assumption to explain
the fact that players do not play the game in the way that the backwards induction
argument suggests. Thus, while the argument might not apply as a contingent matter of
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But I want to suggest now that the backwards induction argument does
not depend so essentially on this sort of interpersonal knowledge. The
argument, for all intents and purposes, will go through just as well if an
agent is only required to have a sound knowledge of his own rationality
and, in particular, if it is assumed that an agent knows that he cannot
rationally intend or plan to do what he knows he will not rationally do
(when the occasion arrives for him to act on that intention). To see this,
consider the following variation on the centipede game.16 Suppose
Perfectly Reliable Bart makes the following offer to Art: that at any
point n in the game where it is Bart’s turn he (Bart) will take only one
coin so long as Art can form the intention at n to take only one coin on
the next play of the game, n+1, when it is Art’s turn. Bart is assumed
here to be perfectly reliable in the sense that he always takes one coin at
n on observing that Art has formed the requisite intention at n. Thus,
there is no question here of Art having to make any difficult assumptions
about Bart’s rationality, let alone any higher level assumptions about
Bart’s knowledge of Art’s rationality or, further, about Bart’s knowledge
about Art’s knowledge about Bart’s rationality. And, likewise, Bart
does not need to know any of this about Art, although, for the purposes
of the argument, Bart does need to be able to observe Art’s intentions at
any play of the game.17
Consider again the problem from Art’s point of view. A new offer
from Bart is only worthwhile to Art if he can form the requisite intention
at that point to take only one coin on the next play of the game. But, at
Art’s last possible move in the game, when there are only two coins left
on the table, Art knows he will take both of them (after all, there is no
possibility at this point of getting any new offers from Bart, and rational
behavior, we assume, consists of maximizing one’s monetary payoff).
fact, it is not as if they think there is any thing problematic with the argument, as such.
Philosophers confronting the backwards induction argument are more inclined to think
that there is something necessarily (not just contingently) wrong with the argument itself.
Graham Priest has also noted that there is this difference in approach between philosophers
and game theorists more generally. Graham Priest, The Logic of Backwards Inductions,
16 ECON. & PHIL. 267, 267–68 (2000). For a good review of the broad range of
philosophical arguments dealing with backwards induction, most of them dealing with
so-called surprise exam paradox, see generally ROY A. SORENSEN, BLINDSPOTS (1988).
16. This is a version of the variation introduced by SORENSEN, supra note 15, at
337. It builds on a problem about intentions introduced by Gregory Kavka. Gregory S.
Kavka, The Toxin Puzzle, 43 ANALYSIS 33, 33–36 (1983).
17. Of course, there might appear to be something implausible about assuming that
one person can observe another’s state of mind, e.g., another person’s intentions. But
not even this is really necessary. What is needed is only that Art believes this about Bart.
However, as I hope now to suggest with this variation on the original example, the real
implausibility of the backwards induction argument does not seem to turn on the
particular version of interpersonal transparency that is used. The real problem appears to
be in the notion of individual rationality that is being assumed.
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Thus, he knows, by assumption, that he cannot form the requisite
intention at the move before this, when there are three coins on the table
(and where it is Bart’s move), to take only one coin on the next move.
Thus, he knows that an offer from Bart at this point is worthless to him.
But then, he asks himself, why not take two coins on the move (his
second last possible move) just before this move by Bart? Art would
only not take two coins if, by taking one coin instead, he could again get
Bart to make a worthwhile offer to him at the next move. But Art has
already concluded that such an offer is worthless to him because he
cannot form the requisite intention to make it worthwhile. So Art knows
that it is pointless to take only one coin on his second to last move; he
should take two. But then, of course, he cannot form the requisite
intention at Bart’s immediately prior move to take only one coin. And
so Bart’s offer to him at that point is also worthless. But why then, he
asks himself again, should he not take two coins at his third last possible
move? To take only one coin at this point only generates another
worthless offer. In like manner, it can be shown that all the prior offers
that Bart might make to Art are worthless and that, as a consequence,
Art will take two coins on the first move of the game. And none of this
argument makes any general demands on Art’s knowledge of Bart’s
rationality or vice versa. All that is required is that Art know that he
cannot form an intention to do something that he knows he will not
rationally do.
This last requirement seems acceptable in general, but particular
interpretations of it might not be. The real force of the requirement is in
the idea that a rational agent cannot intend to do what he knows he will
not do. But how does he know that he will not do it? Because, the
argument goes, he knows that it will be irrational for him to do it. So
far, so good; this much also seems acceptable. The difficulty arises on
the interpretation of practical rationality that is used. If practical
rationality means, simply, acting for (undefeated) reasons (and in
rational choice theory this means acting according to reasons as
manifested in preferences, all things considered), then the requirement
reduces to the idea that a rational agent cannot intend to do what he
knows he has reason not to do. For then he knows he will not do it, and
this contradicts the real force of the requirement. But suppose that there
was more to practical rationality than acting for reasons. Then it would
be possible for a rational agent to intend to do something that he had
reason not to do. Why? Because then he might not know that he would
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not rationally do it even though he knew he had reason not to do it. And
without the knowledge that he might not rationally do it, he could intend
to do it in a way that is consistent with the real force of the requirement.
Thus, the possibility that there is more to practical rationality than
acting for reasons opens up the further possibility that an agent can
intend to do what he has reason not to do. Again, it is worth emphasizing
that this is not the same as saying that he can have a reason to intend to
do something that he has reason not to do. That was the possibility with
which we began our investigation in this Part of the Article. And we
saw fairly quickly that an agent could have such countervailing reasons;
the examples of the centipede game and of promising seem to establish
this point in a practically important way. What was problematic for the
agent, however, was whether the reasons that he had for his prior
intentions or promises could ever be made effective: could he actually
form these intentions, or make these promises, if he had reason actually
not to do as he intended or promised? The backwards induction
argument, as applied to intentions (in the intrapersonal knowledge case)
and promises (in the interpersonal knowledge case), suggested not. But
now we can see that this argument turns on the same assumption that we
have been questioning all along—namely, that practical rationality
consists only in acting for reasons. For only then does the real force of
the more general requirement—that an agent cannot rationally intend or
plan to do what he knows he will not rationally do—reduce to the more
particular idea that an agent cannot rationally intend or plan to do what
he knows that he will have reason not to do.18
The suggestion here is that we should accept the real force of the
general requirement, but not the particular interpretation of that idea that
drives the backwards induction. That is because there is something more
18. In some very helpful comments on an earlier version of this Article, Wlodek
Rabinowicz questioned whether it was plausible to impose this general requirement (viz.,
that an agent cannot rationally intend or plan to do what he knows he will not rationally
do). He suggested that even if an agent knew that he would not do x rationally when the
time came actually to do it, the agent could nevertheless rationally intend or plan to do x
if it was thought that forming the intention or plan would make it more likely that x
would actually be done (albeit not rationally). It may even be that Ulysses binding
himself to the mast to overcome (nonrationally) the lure of the Sirens provides us with a
classic example of such an effective and rational plan. However, in this sort of example,
it seems that the physical restraint rather than the intention itself is doing the work to
hold the agent to the plan. If Rabinowicz means to suggest that the mere fact of having
adopted the intention or the plan, without more (such as using physical restraints, giving
up hostages, etc., measures which either avoid the influence of reasons or change their
balance at the moment of acting) can make it more likely that the act will be done, then
he is closer to the structure of the problem being analyzed here. But then, as this Article
will go on to argue in the next section, I am inclined to say that an act carried out under
the normative requirements of an adopted intention or plan is rational rather than
irrational.
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to practical rationality than acting for reasons. I hope that this Part of the
Article has given us some indication of why it might be important that
there is something more. The next Part of the Article will tell us more
specifically what that something more is.
III. THE NORMATIVE REQUIREMENTS OF PRACTICAL RATIONALITY
Let us begin by reconsidering our earlier example of theoretical
reasoning. Theoretical reasoning, it is said, takes us from one belief
state to another. Thus, if you begin by believing the proposition that
Frankfurt is in Germany (FG) and the proposition that Germany is in
Europe (GE), then theoretical reason would have you conclude by
believing the proposition that Frankfurt is in Europe (FE). Suppose that
you do in fact believe FG and GE. Does this mean that you have a
reason to believe FE? You may have reason to believe this (as it
happens you do!), but not because of your beliefs about FG and GE. In
fact, you might have no reason at all to believe FE or only have reasons
not to believe FE. Thus, while it is true that if you believe FG and GE,
you should then believe FE, there is nothing in this that gives you any
reason to believe FE.
To see why, consider this alternative example. Suppose that you
believe the proposition that Toronto is in Germany (TG) and the
proposition that Germany is in Europe (GE). Then, theoretical reason
would have you conclude by believing the proposition that Toronto is in
Europe (TE). But you have no reason, based on these beliefs, to believe
TE. Indeed, you have many other reasons, independent of these beliefs,
not to believe TE. And it is not that these other reasons, based on
independent beliefs, simply prevail over, or outweigh, the reason you
have to believe TE based on your beliefs in TG and GE. Rather, it is
that there simply is no such reason to believe TE at all. Any independent
reason not to believe TE would be enough to provide an all-thingsconsidered reason not to believe TE, at least if the only “reason” that you
claimed for believing TE was your belief in TG and GE. This suggests
that the weighing of conflicting reasons simply has no application here.
The beliefs in TG and GE add nothing to the balance of reasons for
believing TE.
But there does seem to be some sort of normative connection between
believing TG (or FG) and GE and believing TE (or FE). What is that
connection if it is not that believing the first two propositions provides a
“reason” for why you should believe the third? John Broome provides
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an answer.19 Although your beliefs in the first two propositions provide
no reason for you to believe the third, they do normatively require you
to believe the third. Normative requirements differ from reasons, says
Broome, in that they are strict and relative. They are strict because, in
the context of theoretical reasoning, they really do require or obligate
you to the conditional that if you believe TG and GE, then you should
believe TE. If you believe TG and GE, but do not believe TE, then you
are not entirely as you should be; in particular, you have failed to meet
the normative requirements of rationality (here, the requirements of good
theoretical reasoning). But these requirements, while strict, are relative
because they do not detach from the conditional proposition “if . . . ,
then . . .” and, therefore, do not give you any reason to believe TE tout
court.
Reasons, on the other hand, are not relative in this way; they do detach
and do give independent reasons, say, to believe TE (e.g., perhaps a very
reputable geographer told you that TE). But these reasons are not strict;
they are only pro tanto. That is, while you might have this independent
reason to believe TE, it still might be that you do not believe it, perhaps,
because you have some other independent stronger reason for not
believing it (e.g., that TE goes against everything you were taught in
school). However, because reasons are not strict, not believing what you
have a reason to believe is quite consistent with being entirely as you
ought to be. While there might be a reason to believe TE, the balance of
independent or detached pro tanto reasons might be such that you do not
believe TE. That is no problem.
Reasons, therefore, are weaker than normative requirements in being
only pro tanto and not being strict. But they are stronger than normative
requirements in being independent rather than relative. These are
differences that go to the very logical structure of each. We are now
ready to see how these important logical differences are relevant to
practical reasoning and what they can do for an agent.
Practical reasoning, as I have already said, differs from theoretical
reasoning in that it concludes in a state of mind that involves a decision
or intention (usually, to act) rather than a belief. 20 Here is an example:
(1) I intend that (I will visit Heidelberg); and
(2) I believe that (to visit Heidelberg I need to fly to Germany);
and so
(3) I intend that (I will fly to Germany).

19. Broome, Requirements, supra note 4, at 401; Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?,
supra note 4, at 105.
20. Broome, Normative, supra note 4, at 175.
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The bracketed propositions provide the content for the different
statements and the prior nonbracketed terms reveal my state of mind, or
attitude, with respect to each of the propositions. The logic of the
reasoning is contained in the propositions themselves.21 We can see this
if we think of these same three propositions under the aspect of
theoretical reasoning, where only belief states of mind apply. If I
believe the bracketed proposition in (1) and the bracketed proposition in
(2), then the “and so” logic of theoretical reasoning will have me
conclude that I believe the bracketed proposition in (3). In the practical
reasoning that is described by the above example, the same “and so”
logic applies, although now it takes us from an intention state of mind in
(1) and the belief state of mind in (2) to the concluding intention state of
mind in (3).
We can now pose questions about practical reasoning that are fully
analogous to the ones that we posed earlier about theoretical reasoning.
Does my prior intention in (1) together with my belief in (2) give me any
reason for my final derivative intention in (3)? No, not any more than
the same logic applied to the following three statements would give you
any analogous reason to have the derivative intention in (6) in this
example:
(4) I intend that (I will visit Heidelberg); and
(5) I believe that (to visit Heidelberg I need to fly to Canada);
and so
(6) I intend that (I will fly to Canada).
The prior intention in (4) together with the belief in (5) gives me no
reason to have the derivative intention in (6).
Nor is any reason that I might have for my prior intention in (1) (or in
(4)) transferred by the logic of practical reasoning into a reason for me to
have the final intention in (3) (or in (6)). I may have independent pro
tanto reasons to intend to fly to Canada or not to fly to Canada, and what
I have most reason to do in that respect will be determined by the
balance of these independent reasons. However, the fact that I have a
reason to have the intention in (1) (or (4)) will add nothing to the
balance.
But it is true that I am normatively required to have the intention in
(3) (or in (6)) if I have the intention in (1) (or in (4)) and the belief in (2)
21.

Broome, Practical Reasoning, supra note 4, at 89.

107

CHAPMAN

4/7/2005 10:07 AM

(or in (5)). While relative in this way, this normative requirement of
practical rationality is, as all such normative requirements are, strict. In
other words, if I do have the intention in (1) (or in (4)) and the belief in
(2) (or in (5)), then, if I do not have the intention in (3) (or in (6)), I am
not entirely as I should be. In particular, I have failed to meet the
normative requirements of practical rationality.
These are, by now, familiar enough points. So let us add a little
conflict into the mix. Suppose that I do have the intention in (1) and the
belief in (2). Then, I am normatively required to have the intention in
(3). If I don’t, I am not entirely as I should be. But suppose that I have
an independent reason not to have the intention in (3) and, further, no
independent reason to have it (perhaps there is a strike by air traffic
controllers in Germany, making any flight to Germany less safe). Then
the strict normative requirements of practical rationality are in conflict
with my independent pro tanto reasons. Am I still entirely as I should
be? It seems not. Something is wrong here and needs sorting out.
Here is where the relative quality of normative requirements of
practical rationality can be useful. The strict quality of these normative
requirements obligates me to have the derivative intention in (3), but
only if I have the prior intention in (1) and the belief in (2). Thus, I can
satisfy these strict requirements either by accepting the antecedent
conditions of the conditional and accepting the consequent (modus
ponens), or by rejecting the consequent and rejecting one or other (or
both) of the antecedent conditions that require the consequent (modus
tollens). The fact that I have an independent reason for rejecting the
consequent seems to provide me with some motivation for the second
method of satisfying the normative requirements of practical rationality.
Then, I could satisfy both my independent reason for not having the
intention in (3) and the strict normative requirements of practical
rationality. And, after this adjustment, I would be entirely as I should
be.
Suppose, as seems reasonable, I cannot adjust my beliefs in (2).22
Then, to make the necessary adjustment, I would need to change or
repudiate my prior intention in (1).23 But that does not seem problematic,
at least on the argument so far. So far I have not provided any reason for
22. On the difficulty of deciding to believe, see BERNARD WILLIAMS, Deciding to
Believe, in PROBLEMS OF THE SELF 136, 136–51 (1973) (describing the dilemma of
whether belief can be related to decision and will).
23. Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?, supra note 4, at 112. Note that, for
Broome, repudiation is more than merely ceasing to have the prior intention, but it might
not require a reason either. For suppose there was no reason for the prior intention.
Why, then, should it take a reason to give it up? Broome requires repudiation to be
deliberative, but not necessarily with reason, something that is a little mysterious.
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my prior intention in (1); there is only the fact that I have it. But it
seems implausible that the mere fact of having this prior intention could
count for much if I have an independent reason not to have the
derivative intention in (3). This is consistent with the insight that a prior
intention in (1), together with the belief in (2), gives me no reason to
have the derivative intention in (3). Thus, while the normative
requirements of practical rationality strictly require me to have the
intention in (3) if, as a matter of fact, I have the intention in (1), they do
not provide much normative resistance against my changing that fact by
repudiating the intention in (1).
What if you had no reason to adopt the prior intention and no reason
not to follow through on it by adopting the derivative intention? Does
this mean that you ought to satisfy the normative requirements of
practical rationality by accepting the antecedent conditions of the
conditional and accepting the consequent? John Broome thinks not; you
are still at liberty to repudiate the prior intention and deny the
consequent. If there was no reason to adopt the prior intention in the
first place, there is no reason not to repudiate it.24 Yet he provides an
interesting example that, ironically, goes some part of the way towards
challenging the rationality of his approach.25 While the example is
somewhat special, it sets the stage, I believe, for thinking that there
might be something irrational in always repudiating the prior intention
and, more particularly, in repudiating it in those cases where one has a
reason in favor of a prior intention and a reason against the derivative
intention. The latter, of course, are the cases most analogous to those we
saw earlier when we discussed whether you might have a reason to
choose to do something that you have reason not to do—namely, the
sorts of situations captured by the centipede game and promising.
Broome’s example, borrowed from Kierkegaard’s Fear and Trembling,
turns on the idea that certain values are incommensurable. We are to
imagine the situation where God has told Abraham to take his son Isaac
to the mountain and sacrifice him there. The options at the moment of
prior intention are either to intend to obey, thereby showing one’s
submission to God, or intend to disobey, thereby saving Isaac’s life and
preserving one’s relationship with him. Broome argues that the values
here are incommensurable, something that does make sense of these

24.
25.

Id. at 118.
Id. at 114.
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situations (and other such tragic choices26) as posing a moral dilemma
for the protagonist. Neither option is better than the other, nor are they
equally good. For some theorists, this is simply what incommensurability
means.27
Yet, Abraham must decide. Because the options are incommensurable,
there is no reason to decide in favor of either one of the options rather
than the other.28 As we know from the story, Abraham decides to obey
God and sets out for the mountain. But now, suppose that, at any
point—say, at the foot of the mountain—he can change his mind and
repudiate his prior intention. Is there any reason not to? If the values
continue to be incommensurable, the answer is presumably not. So, this
is a situation where, first, there is no reason to adopt the prior intention
to obey God rather than save Isaac and, second, no reason to carry out
that prior intention as a derivative intention rather than not carry it out
under a repudiation of the prior intention. Because of the incommensurability
of the values, the balance of pro tanto reasons has no role here.
Yet, simply because one has already formed the prior intention, there
might be something problematic in repudiating it, a point Broome
explicitly recognizes.29 For by adopting the prior intention and then
repudiating it, Abraham has ended up taking a course of action that is
worse than another course of action that he could have adopted by never
adopting the prior intention in the first place. Had he never adopted the
prior intention to obey God, he would, of course, have given up the
value that was contained in that option. But, at least, he would have
preserved all that was valuable in his relationship with Isaac. However,
by adopting the prior intention and then repudiating it at the foot of the
mountain, Abraham has both given up the value of obeying God and
sacrificed something of his relationship with Isaac. Thus, although
neither of his decisions (for one option rather than the other) was wrong,
or against reason (again, because these values are incommensurable), the
26. See GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBITT, TRAGIC CHOICES 18 (1978) (pointing
to the inability to reconcile deeply incommensurable values). Great tragedy more generally
makes much of these moments of choice between the seemingly incommensurable—e.g.,
Antigone’s choice between the obligations of citizenship and the obligations to her dead
brother or Agamemnon’s choice between his daughter and his obligations as a military
leader, etc. See SOPHOCLES, ANTIGONE 56 (Richard Emil Braun trans., 1973); AESCHYLUS,
AGAMEMNON 26–29 (Hugh Lloyd-Jones trans., 1970).
27. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 322 (1986).
28. This is not to say that there are no reasons for choosing one or the other.
Indeed, that there are such reasons is the source of the dilemma. However, while there
are reasons for choosing the one option and reasons for choosing the other, because of
the incommensurability there are no reasons for choosing the one rather than the other. I
am grateful both to Shachar Lifshitz and to Wlodek Rabinowicz for encouraging me to
clarify this point.
29. Broome, Are Intentions Reasons?, supra note 4, at 116–17.
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two decisions together add up to a course of action that was worse for
him (and, incidentally, for Isaac) than one he could have chosen. And
this last assessment is one we can make despite the incommensurability
of the values; the course of action finally chosen is no better for the
value of obeying God and worse for the value of preserving the
relationship with Isaac.
Had Abraham not repudiated his prior intention, then he would have at
least achieved the value of obeying God (which he had no reason not to
do). Thus, a resolute commitment to carry out his prior intention allows
Abraham to avoid a bad outcome in a way that his repudiation of that
prior intention does not. Broome concedes this, but does not consider it
irrational for Abraham to repudiate the prior intention. Why? Because,
he says, there was no reason, at either of the two points where a decision
had to be made, not to make the particular decision that was made.
Thus, since no particular decision was ever made contrary to reason,
there was no irrationality in the overall course of action.
This comes very close to reducing practical rationality to action
according to reason, something that Broome has been very careful to
avoid. Of course, Broome is not, strictly speaking, guilty of this
reduction. After all, at the base of the mountain, when Abraham decides
to turn back from the sacrifice, Abraham is also obliged to repudiate his
prior intention so that the normative requirements of practical rationality
are met. Nevertheless, Broome’s willingness to count repudiation as a
course of action that is as rational as being resolute and following
through on the prior intention—despite the fact that values are less well
served in the former—is troubling, and it seems to depend on the idea
that there cannot be less rationality in the former if its particular choices
or actions are no more contrary to reasons than actions in the latter.
Perhaps, under repudiation, the problem is the way that the rationality
of all the particular choices, as choices never contrary to reason, are
generalized to a broader and more categorical assessment of the
rationality of an overall course of action. This, it will be recalled, was
the problem we confronted earlier in our discussion of backwards
induction. While Broome’s careful analysis of normative requirements
allows him to claim that there is more to practical rationality than acting
according to (the balance of pro tanto) reasons, his unwillingness to
privilege any particular method for resolving violations of these
normative requirements exposes him to the possibility that a resolution
can proceed just as rationally from back to front, as in the repudiation of
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a prior intention, as front to back, when the prior intention is actually
carried out under a later derivative intention. The result, I think, is no
less paradoxical than what we saw under backwards induction. One
might have hoped that all this structural analysis of practical rationality
would do more for us than this.
And I think it can. However, before showing what this might be, we
need first to appreciate why Broome might be concerned about labeling
the repudiation of a prior intention as irrational. Consider the following
sort of example, which Broome discusses briefly in another context
before he developed his analysis of the difference between reasons and
the normative requirements of practical rationality.30 Suppose that you
have good reason to choose to drop in on a friend, Mrs. Silstein, on the
way home from work. She is an elderly widow, on her own, and would
love a visit from you. On the other hand, you really do not want to
spend the whole evening with her (perhaps there is something on
television that you do not want to miss). So the best plan of action, a
plan that most satisfies all your reasons for acting, is to form the
intention to stay only a short time and be resolute in carrying out this
intention. Call this course of action Resolute (R). However, you know
that, once there with Mrs. Silstein, you will want to stay and keep her
company, with the result that you will give up the whole evening (and
your television show). Call this course of action Stay (S). So, on the
way to seeing her, you repudiate your prior intention to visit with her
and head straight for home. Call this course of action Home (H). This
appears to be the best that you can do for yourself given your current
preferences and what you think is possible for you to do rationally.
Broome recognizes that it is tempting to label the resolute course of
action R as more rational than the course of action H involving
repudiation. By being resolute, you can achieve everything of value in
being home and something of value in being there for your friend. The
repudiation of the prior intention sacrifices the latter possibility
completely, something which is contrary to the reasons that you have at
the moment of the prior intention (when you rank the different courses
of action in the order, from left to right, RHS) and at the moment when
you are actually visiting (when you would rank them SRH).31 So, while
30. John Broome, Book Review, 102 ETHICS 666, 666–67 (1992) (reviewing
EDWARD F. MCCLENNEN, RATIONALITY AND DYNAMIC CHOICE (1990)).
31. Of course, when you are actually visiting your friend, course of action H is not
actually available any more. But it is still sensible to say, at that point, that you rank the
course of action that repudiates the possibility of visiting as worst of all (“How awful it
would have been not to have had this time together!”). It is useful to compare these
rankings (RHS and SRH) with those presented in the problem posed by Amartya Sen in
his theorem on the “impossibility of a Paretian Liberal.” See Amartya Sen, The
Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal, 78 J. POL. ECON. 152, 152–57 (1970). Sen showed
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reasons and commensurable values are in play here in a way that they
were not in the Abraham and Isaac example, there seems to be the same
kind of irrationality in repudiating one’s prior intention here as there was
in that example. But this is where Broome offers a powerful objection.
While Broome felt that, in the face of incommensurable values and the
absence of reasons to choose one incommensurable option rather than
another, there was no irrationality in Abraham either resolutely holding
to his prior intention or repudiating it, in the Mrs. Silstein example he
argues that there would be irrationality in being resolute and not
repudiating the prior intention. Consider what he says:
I think that resolute action is irrational. Having dropped in on Mrs. Silstein,
what reason can you possibly have for leaving? You do not want to, and
nothing would be gained by doing so. If you have a reason, it must be that your
original decision to leave early, made before you entered the house, supplies
one by itself. The reason you had for making this decision—that at the time you
preferred leaving early to staying—is defunct, now that you have changed your
preferences. If resolute action is rational, then, the bare fact of having decided
to do something must in itself be a reason for doing it. But it is plainly not.
Suppose that your original decision resulted from a false belief: suppose that, on
entering the house, you find that Mrs. Silstein needs your company more than
you expected. Or suppose that, when you decided, you did not realize that you
would later change your preferences; you simply change your mind in an
ordinary way. In both these cases, you should stay with Mrs. Silstein, and in
neither would the bare fact of having made the opposite decision constitute even
the weakest reason for leaving early. No more does it in the original example.32

Much in this objection anticipates Broome’s later analysis, already
discussed here, that the mere fact of prior intentions, and even the
reasons that we might have for forming them, cannot provide any
reason, as opposed to normative requirements, for forming the
corresponding derivative intentions and actually following through on
that, for some configurations of preferences, the assignment of even the most minimal
powers of decisiveness (or rights) to two (or more) different individuals might mean the
violation of the Pareto principle (or lead to an outcome where all the individuals are
worse off than they could otherwise have been). The same sort of problem arises in the
Mrs. Silstein example under dynamic choice where, instead of two different individuals,
we are dealing with only one individual, but one who has an early self and a later self
with different preferences. The later self (visiting with Mrs. Silstein) has the power (and
a preference) to choose course of action S (staying on with Mrs. Silstein) over course of
action R (resolutely leaving early); the early self, anticipating this choice by the later
self, has the power (and a preference) to choose course of action H (repudiating any visit
with Mrs. Silstein) over course of action S. The result is course of action H, a course of
action that both the early and later selves consider inferior to course of action R. Thus,
we end up with a Pareto inferior outcome, for some a (socially) irrational result.
32. Broome, supra note 30, at 668.
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them with actions. As Broome suggests, without any reason not to, you
are always free to change your mind. And given his more recent
analysis of the normative requirements of practical rationality, you
change your mind deliberatively and rationally by repudiating your prior
intention.
However, despite what Broome says in the last sentence of this
passage, there are important differences between the original example
and the close variations on it that he discusses in the course of making
his point in favor of the rationality of repudiation. The differences turn
out to be important once one has taken on the idea that normative
requirements, as well as reasons, play a role in practical rationality.
Consider again the original example. In that example, at the time you
form your prior intention to be resolute (adopting course of action R),
you anticipate and deliberate over the possibility that, when you are
visiting with Mrs. Silstein at the later time, you will want to stay rather
than leave early. Yet, in the face of that fully anticipated possibility,
you, nevertheless, form the intention or plan to be resolute. Of course,
you do so with good reason (namely, that resolute action seems to allow
you to satisfy both your prior preferences for an evening at home and
something of your preferences, before and after this point, for spending
some time with Mrs. Silstein), but the rationality of now following
through on this prior intention, in the face of contrary reasons that you
had fully anticipated would arise, is not reason-based. That it could not
be is Broome’s constant point in emphasizing the logical distinction
between reasons and the normative requirements of practical rationality.
However, following through on the prior intention could be normatively
required.
Now, Broome will say that the normative requirements of practical
rationality, being relative, do not require any follow through in the
consequent derivative intention (and action under that derivative
intention). It is just as consistent with these normative requirements,
and, therefore, just as practically rational, to abandon any consequent
derivative intention (and action) so long as one repudiates the antecedent
prior intention. But what reason is there to do the latter? Broome’s
variations on the original example suggest new considerations that might
provide a reason. For example, “you find Mrs. Silstein needs your
company more than you expected,”33 or “you did not realize you would
later change your preferences [and] you simply change your mind in an
ordinary way.”34 Of course, on these variations, the changes in the
situation might well give you a reason to repudiate your prior intention.
33.
34.
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You did not think of these possibilities in advance, and it would be
almost thoughtlessly mechanical to go ahead with the prior intention
without allowing these new possibilities to have some sort of rational
impact on what you should do. But in the original example there are no
such surprises for you. The situation, complete with the reasons that you
now have for wanting to stay longer with Mrs. Silstein, has unfolded
exactly as you anticipated it would when you formed your prior
intention or plan. How, therefore, can there be any reason, not already
contemplated and accounted for under that prior intention or plan, to
change your course of action? Surely, there is only the normative
requirement to carry out the course of action, as it was planned or
intended, for exactly the sort of circumstances (including the reasons
that you now have for staying) that arose.
Attending to this difference between the original example and its
variations does require you to attend to some of the content of what you
intended and, more specifically, what you contemplated under the prior
intention. You need to do this to know whether the prior intention
unambiguously applies to the situation as it arises at the time of forming
the derivative intention and acting on it. This may even have you
considering what was thought to be the balance of reasons at the
moment of this prior intention—for example, that on balance you
thought they favored leaving Mrs. Silstein early even though you knew
that, at the time of the visit, you would want to stay. But, when this sort
of content for your prior intention is brought forward into the situation
where carrying out the prior intention is at issue, it is not that the reasons
qua reasons are being carried forward to that point. Again, that would
be to fail to appreciate Broome’s essential point about the difference
between reasons and the normative requirements of rationality. Rather,
when the content of the prior intention, and even the balance of reasons
that make up this content, is brought forward into the actual choice
situation, it is only to apply correctly, and accurately, the normative
requirements of practical rationality, not the original reasons for the
prior intention.
This is an important difference made possible by Broome’s logical
distinction between reasons and the normative requirements of practical
rationality. For if (contrary to Broome’s argument) the reasons themselves
were brought forward, then they would be the sort of thing that was
accessible to the claim that those reasons are now defunct or no longer
apply as reasons in exactly the way that Broome suggests in the above
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passage. However, if they come forward as a content for the application
of a prior intention, not yet repudiated (or defunct) and, given their
content, if they account already for all reasons that might otherwise have
called for such a repudiation, then all that remains unaccounted for is the
satisfaction of the normative requirements of rationality in the actual
doing of what one has intended—even, it should be noted, if one has (an
anticipated) reason not to do what one has intended.
This last point is the crucial one for the final application of this
analysis to the problems uncovered in the last section when we looked
into the centipede game and the problem of promising. For there the
promisor, faced with playing the centipede game, seemed to be caught
by the fact that, while he had a reason to make the promise to take only
one coin, and the same reason to intend to carry out that promise, he also
had a reason not to carry it out. And, if he knew that he had a reason not
to carry it out, he would know, on the argument that reduced rationality
to never acting contrary to (the balance of) reasons, that he could not
intend to carry it out. This seemed to render the whole practice of
promising worthless to him.
But suppose, as this Part of the Article (following Broome) has argued,
that there is more to practical rationality than acting in accordance with (the
balance of) reasons. Suppose in particular that there is the practical
rationality of acting under normative requirements as well. Then there
would be the possibility of forming an intention to do what one has
reason not to do. More specifically, one could form the intention to
carry out a promise that one has reason not to carry out. But now
suppose further (contrary to what Broome seems to allow) that the
content of this intended promise was such that it anticipated and
accounted for the very consideration that is proposed as a reason for not
carrying it out as intended. The promisor, in other words, is well aware,
at the moment that he forms his prior intention, that he will have (some
particular balance of) reasons to renege on the promise that he makes.
And yet he makes the promise, with the full intention of carrying it out.
Then, on the analysis provided in this Part, the (balance of) reasons not
to carry out the promise, having already been accounted for under the
intention to form the promise, would only have a place under the
normative requirements of rationality to carry out the promise that one
has intended (at least, if one has, in fact, formed the prior intention to
carry out the promise, and only so long as one has not repudiated this
prior intention). These reasons would not, in other words, act as further
independent reasons for not carrying out the promise because these
reasons have already been anticipated and comprehended within the
prior intention that forms the basis for applying the normative
requirements of practical rationality. But without any independent
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reason not to do as one has intended, and without any independent
reason to repudiate that prior intention, there is only the normative
requirement to carry out the promise as intended. Thus, there can be
practical rationality in carrying out a promise that one has made, and
might have had reason to make, even if one has (a balance of) reasons
not to carry it out. The key is that the (balance of) reasons for not
carrying out the promise must be anticipated and accounted for under the
prior intention.35
Broome is correct, however, to challenge the rationality of not
repudiating one’s prior intention in the face of new unanticipated
reasons for not doing as one has intended to do. This is the force of the
variations that he provides on the original Mrs. Silstein example. To
feel obliged, under the normative requirements of rationality, to do
something that one has formed the prior intention to do, simply because
as a matter of fact one has intended it, and even though new

35. It would also be important that the prior intention satisfy some sort of
rationality requirement at the time it was formed. An obviously irrational intention or
plan, for example, should not oblige the agent to carry it out as a matter of normative
requirement even if the circumstances ex post were exactly as they were anticipated ex
ante. Nor would such a rationality requirement on the prior intention be limited to the
idea that the agent be better off if circumstances unfold as intended, or as anticipated,
than she would be if no such intention or plan been adopted at all. Such a requirement
might be either too restrictive or not restrictive enough, depending on what set of
anticipated circumstances the agent considered for the purposes of this comparison. For
example, under a threat of mutual annihilation, carrying out the threat seems irrational,
even though, strictly, it might be normatively required if the threatened party simply acts
in the very way that the threat contemplated. The source of the irrationality, however, is
in the making of such an extreme threat initially, even though, had the threat been
successful in at least one of the ways the agent must have anticipated as possible, the
agent (not having had to carry out the costly threat) would have been better off than she
was not having made any threat at all. Thus, this last welfare comparison is not restrictive
enough. One might be tempted to say in the alternative, therefore, that it is not rational
to form an intention or plan, and to carry it out as normatively required, if carrying it out
makes one worse off than would have been had the intention or plan not been adopted at
all. But this is too restrictive a comparison to make since it seems to preclude making
some perfectly rational (more moderate) threats, at least if the carrying out of those
threats can make the agent worse off than she was before making the threat. It is
obviously crucial, therefore, for the overall theory of rational commitment to have an
account of what intentions or plans it is rational to adopt. For excellent analysis of this
point, see Joe Mintoff, Rational Cooperation, Intention, and Reconsideration, 107 ETHICS
612, 635–42 (1997). The purpose of this Article, however, is only to emphasize that
once such rational plans and intentions are adopted, it is also rational, as a matter of
normative requirement, to carry them out, at least if they are not repudiated for some
unanticipated pro tanto reason, and even if doing so is contrary to the balance of fully
anticipated pro tanto reasons.
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considerations have arisen which suggest that there are now reasons not
to do as one intended, does seem irrational. Indeed, it seems closed
minded and mechanical rather than rational. Someone who has formed a
prior intention to do something after a careful consideration of certain
consequences might well feel rational in following through on this
intention, even if the already considered consequences are of the kind
that now give reasons not to do as one has intended. That is simply to
feel the normative requirements of practical rationality. However,
someone who allows the prior formation of such an intention to blind
him to any new reasons that might countervail the prior intention is
blocking out another component of practical rationality—namely, the
independent reasons that one has for action at any point in time. While
it is a mistake to think that all of practical rationality is action according
to the balance of reasons (or the balance of preference based on reasons),
a common mistake that Broome corrects with his analysis of normative
requirements, it is also a mistake to think that (at any moment calling for
action) all of practical rationality is action according to normative
requirements. A full account of practical rationality must comprehend
both the rationality of following through on one’s prior intentions, even
though there may arise (fully anticipated) reasons for abandoning those
intentions, and the rationality of always being open to the repudiation of
these prior intentions in the face of new, truly independent (unanticipated)
reasons. This is the full account of rationality that is allowed for by
Broome’s analysis, and it is an account of rationality that, even in the
face of countervailing reasons, allows a rational agent to follow through
on rational commitments, or promises, rationally made.36
IV. DEFEASIBLE LEGAL RULES
The argument to this point has been complicated by the presence of
some quite subtle theoretical distinctions. For example, there appears to
be an important difference between reasons and practical rationality.
While reasons are an important part of practical rationality, they are not
its whole. There are also the normative requirements of practical rationality
36. While it is not the purpose of this paper to develop this point in any detail, it is
tempting to speculate that when something unexpected comes up that provides the agent
with an independent pro tanto reason against carrying out some prior intention, then the
agent should weigh these new reasons against the balance of reasons that she had for
adopting the prior intention and carrying it out in the first place. Of course, this does mean
that in this unexpected new circumstance, previously accounted for reasons are being
reconsidered. What is not permitted under a rational commitment is the reconsideration of
previously accounted for reasons when circumstances develop exactly as expected.
Again, I am grateful to Wlodek Rabinowicz for raising this point and encouraging me to
consider it.
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to be accounted for, and these are logically distinct from reasons.
Normative requirements are strict, but relative, whereas reasons hold
only pro tanto, but are independent. Further, for reasons themselves,
there is an important separation between the different moments in which
we can have reasons within a single decision process. We can (on
balance) have reasons to choose or intend to do something that (on
balance) we have reason not to do.
These subtleties, while interesting theoretically, might make us question
whether there really could be any such form of rational decisionmaking
in practice. However, in this Part of the Article, I want to argue that this
form of rational decisionmaking is more than a mere theoretical construct.
The institutionalization of this form of decisionmaking should be familiar
to legal theorists as something that they study every day. The conjunction
of reasons and the normative requirements of practical rationality, I
suggest, is to be found in any system of defeasible legal rules. I will
focus specifically on common law adjudication to make my point.
A system of common law is more than a mere list of all the decisions
that judges have chosen to impose upon litigants. It is also comprised of
the legal rules which are said to bring order to these different results. Of
course, within the common law method of adjudication, these rules do
not typically appear in some preexisting authoritative text, like the rules
of a tax code. Rather, they develop over time in the cases—sometimes
abruptly, more often gradually—as the general rules of, for example, tort
or contract law. This might suggest that the general rules are mere
descriptions of the behavioral regularities of judges. After all, if they do
not preexist the cases, then the only other option seems to be that the
rules come into place as rationalizations for what has actually been done
for some independent reason in the particular case.
Now, it is certainly true that, like the laws of science, rules of law
bring order and understanding to a legal reality which is independently
laid down and which can be the object of external and scientific
observation, the stuff of induction. But, more than this, rules of law are
also said to bring order to a judge’s self-conscious understanding of
what she does and, further, of what she feels she ought to do. Rules, it is
said, help to provide particular justifications for the legal result that she
comes to in a case. Rules, therefore, can be said to order the law from
both an external ex post point of view (the point of view of the scientific
observer) and from an internal ex ante point of view (the point of view
of a committed participant or judge guided by rules in the legal decisions
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she makes).37
However, that legal rules have this double aspect suggests that there
will be some ambiguity as to what the proper relationship should be
between these rules of law and their apparent instantiations in the cases.
Under the more descriptive, scientific account, the particular case sets
the standard for the rule. A rule will fail as a description, or fail to provide a
proper understanding, insofar as it is an inaccurate representation of what is
going on in the case. Although a limited number of exceptions can
sometimes be said to prove the rule (since that is what the very idea of
an exception presupposes), too many will be fatal to its descriptive
claim.
On the other hand, under the more prescriptive account—where rules
are said to provide reasons or justifications for judges to decide cases
one way rather than another—the relationship between a case and the
applicable rule is reversed. Now, the rule sets the standard for the case.
Moreover, because the rule has this seeming autonomy from the cases, it
can pronounce almost any number of them as wrongly decided. The
number of such decisions only attests to the frequency of judicial error,
leaving the legal rule intact and still perfectly capable of governing other
cases.
To accommodate this dual aspect of common law rules, what is
required is an account that allows the rules to be strong enough to guide
judicial decisionmaking in particular cases, but not so strong that it does
not allow for the possibility that these same rules might require revision
in the light of these same cases. This might suggest that what we are
looking for is something quite banal—namely, an account of rules that
merely weighs the good that they do as rules (say, in securing general
expectations, making life more predictable, controlling harmful judicial
discretion, etc.) against the independent good that can be done by
revising or abandoning the rule in some particular case. But I want to
press the intuitive point that a rule, and the following of a rule, is more
strict (or “rule-like”) than this balancing or weighing metaphor allows.
Borrowing from the above analysis, I want to now argue that a rule can
normatively require a particular result in some case without regard to the
good that is achieved in, or frustrated by, that result so long as this good
(and its possible frustration) has already been anticipated by the rule and
is accounted for in it. But a good that is frustrated by that result can also
be an independent reason, even a decisive independent reason, for not
following the normative requirements of a rule. A reason would be
independent in the required sense if it involved a good that was not
37. For discussion of the importance of this internal point of view for the
committed participant in law, see H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 55 (1961).
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anticipated by the rule and accounted for in it. Thus, the integration of
normative requirements of practical rationality and independent reasons
promises to provide the right combination of rule respect and rule denial
that is required if we are properly to accommodate the essential roles that
rules and cases each play within a theory of common law decisionmaking.
This way of integrating the normative requirements of practical
rationality with independent reasons is familiar enough to those who
understand the common law as a system of defeasible rules. Mention of
defeasibility, of course, reminds us of H.L.A. Hart, as Hart was influential
in introducing the idea of defeasibility into legal theory.38 Borrowing
the idea from the law of property, Hart noted that “a legal interest . . . is
subject to termination or ‘defeat’ in a number of different contingencies
but remains intact if no such contingencies mature.”39 Although he
believed that this idea, or more particularly the dual structure of this
idea, had wide application in the law, Hart developed the idea most
explicitly with reference to the concept of a contract. He might equally
have referred to a rule of contract formation. For Hart, as much as for
other legal scholars, there is the usual list of positive conditions required
for the existence of a valid contract (e.g., two parties, an offer by one, its
acceptance by the other, consideration on both sides). However,
knowledge of these conditions does not, according to Hart, give us a full
understanding of the concept of contract nor of the rule of contract
formation. We also need to know the various ways in which the claim
that there is a contract (under the concept or the rule) can be defeated.
Such defenses to the claim might include, for example, that there was
fraudulent misrepresentation, duress, or lunacy. Hart argued, therefore, that
the concept or rule of contract formation was best captured structurally as a
list of conditions that are normally necessary and sufficient for the
existence of a valid contract, together with a series of “unless” clauses
that spell out the conditions under which this existence claim is defeated.
However, Hart recognized that the list of unless clauses could not, in all
likelihood, be exhaustively specified. And so, such a rule would often
end only (and perhaps only implicitly) with the word “unless. . . .”
However, Hart was clear: “A rule that ends with the word ‘unless . . .’ is
still a rule.”40 Specifically, it is a defeasible legal rule.
38. H.L.A. Hart, The Ascription of Responsibilities and Rights, in ESSAYS
LOGIC AND LANGUAGE 145, 145–66 (Antony Flew ed., 1951).
39. Id. at 148.
40. HART, supra note 37, at 136.
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Now Hart’s idea of a defeasible legal rule meets either with
enthusiastic acceptance (amongst legal realists41) or outright skepticism
(amongst legal formalists42) because of the flexibility that it appears to
allow around the rigidity of rules. Here, I want to focus on the skeptical
view, best articulated by Frederick Schauer.43 Schauer argues effectively
that the best interpretations of Hart’s defeasibility claim either reduce his
unless clauses to components of the rule, in which case there is only a
relatively straightforward rule-like application of what is now a more
complicated rule, or they allow the independent force of the unless
clauses to modify the rule in light of some background justifications of
the rule, in which case the background justifications are all that really
apply and the force of the rule qua rule simply disappears.44 This is to
reduce a defeasible legal rule either to a rule without defeasibility or to
defeasibility without a rule.
To make his point, Schauer considers seven possible interpretations of
defeasibility. The first four advance variations on the way in which the
unless clause in the rule can be incorporated into the rule, albeit with
varying degrees of difficulty. For example, in the most simple case, it
may only be that an unless clause is used expressly because some more
convenient technical term or phrase (one that simply defines the conduct
and incorporates the limiting idea within the definition without any use
of the word unless) is not available.45 Schauer rightly dismisses this as a
“trivial linguistic point;”46 there is no extensional difference in the
application of two rules that are merely being expressed in these two
different ways. Likewise, Schauer argues that a version of defeasibility
that simply recognizes that any rule or principle, including legal rules,
might be subject to some sort of override in the face of an overwhelming
moral obligation cannot be what Hart was suggesting. Again, these
overriding concerns could be quite conventionally incorporated into the
rule by adding a closed-ended list of the relevant factors. Of course, it
might be that these factors are only specifiable in the rule in some quite
general way, as some broad type of consideration rather than something
very particular. But this inability to pre-specify (under a more fully
articulated rule) the full extension of the potentially overriding

41. Richard A. Posner, The Jurisprudence of Skepticism, 86 MICH. L. REV. 827,
834–35 (1988).
42. Frederick Schauer, On the Supposed Defeasibility of Legal Rules, 51 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 223, 223–40 (1998).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 226–27; see also FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 212–15
(1991) (discussing same).
45. Schauer, supra note 42, at 227–28.
46. Id. at 227.
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conditions (something Schauer calls “weak non-specifiability”47) is really
no different from the inability to pre-specify the primary prescription
under the rule for lack of an available technical term.
The first four interpretations by Schauer of Hart’s defeasibility claim
are the ones, therefore, that attempt to reduce defeasible legal rules to
rules (albeit more complicated rules) without any significant defeasibility.
If these were all that Hart meant to capture by advancing his claim, then
Schauer would be correct to be skeptical. More interesting are Schauer’s
next three interpretations of Hart’s claim, interpretations that resist the
possibility of writing the defeating consideration into the rule. Under
Schauer’s analysis of these interpretations, a defeasible legal rule is reduced
to a constant state of defeasibility in the light of particular considerations
within the case. The result, says Schauer, is that rules qua rules disappear,
being replaced by the direct application of the background justifications
with respect to which the rules were thought to be instrumental.
Schauer begins this discussion with a reference to what he calls
“strong non-specifiability,”48 by which he means (in contrast to the weak
form discussed above) an inability to specify, even by broad type, the
sorts of conditions that might arise which would defeat a legal rule.
Then, Schauer offers the following interpretation of defeasibility: “A
rule is defeasible when its application is contingent not only upon the
non-occurrence of events specifiable in advance by particular or type,
but also by the non-occurrence of conditions specifiable in advance
neither by particular nor by type.”49
Schauer is careful to consider two possibly different sorts of situations
where there might be such an unanticipated event or condition. First,
there could be an event or condition that, while not precisely anticipated,
clearly lies within both the linguistic contours of the primary rule and
the contours of the rule’s background justification. In that case, says
Schauer, the rule is “simply applied, for the question of defeat does not
arise when . . . language and purpose both encompass [the] case, even if
it is not a case that has previously been imagined.”50 Schauer seems to
think that this is not a very interesting case, although it looks to be a
situation where the rule continues to operate as a rule. This appears to
be because he thinks the rule is doing no real normative work here;
47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 231.
Id.
Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
Id.
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everything is being done by a direct application of the justification or
purpose that the rule serves and which, in this first sort of situation, is in
agreement with what the rule requires. We shall have reason to return to
this point in a moment.
The second sort of situation is one that Schauer thinks is more
interesting. Here, the unanticipated event lies within the linguistic
contours of the rule, but outside its background justification. Yet, says
Schauer:
[I]f any consistency between the rule (as formulated) and the result indicated by
direct application of the rule’s background justification is a sufficient condition
for non-application of the rule, then the rule prohibits no action not prohibited
by the background justification. . . . [A]ll of the normative work is being done
by the justification and none by the rule.51

Combine this result with Schauer’s understanding of the very limited
role that a rule plays in the first sort of situation, where rule and
background justification happened to agree, and the rule seems to
disappear for all practical purposes in all possible situations. Thus
Schauer concludes: “If defeasibility is purchased at the cost of the rule
itself, the cost is too high, at least for the purpose of maintaining, with
Hart and his followers, that ruleness and strong defeasibility can coexist.”52
However, this conclusion is too strong for the argument, and our
earlier analysis of practical rationality, which showed it as being
comprised of both reasons and normative requirements, shows why.
Schauer is right to claim (as in the first sort of situation) that, if some
event (although not precisely anticipated) lies within the contours of the
primary rule and its background justification or (to borrow from earlier
terminology) the reasons that we might have for having the rule, then the
51. Id. at 232–33.
52. Id. at 233. It should be remarked that Schauer does provide a final
interpretation of Hart that saves something of the insight of the defeasibility claim, even
for Schauer. Schauer argues that the force of rules might be presumptive, in that they are
subject to defeat by the existence of particularly powerful defeating conditions that
cannot and need not be specified in advance, so long as the requirement of particular
power can be specified in advance and is not itself subject to defeat. This would allow
the rule to carry some decisionmaking force up to some threshold point (the measure of
which is itself nondefeasible), and before a direct application of the rule’s background
justification takes over. However, such an interpretation of defeasibility makes the
choice between applying the rule and applying the background justification merely a
quantitative matter. But without providing a more qualitative or categorical distinction
between the application of rules and the application of background justifications, there is
the possibility, and danger, that this interpretation of defeasibility will collapse the
former into the latter and the normativity of rules will again disappear into the
particularity of an all-embracing defeasibility. The categorical (logical) distinction
between normative requirements and reasons that I suggest in this Article as a way to
account for defeasible legal rules avoids this collapse.
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rule is “simply applied.” However, he is mistaken in thinking that we
could just as easily apply the background justification directly in this
sort of situation and, therefore, that the rule does no real normative
work. The rule does do its own normative work here, but it does so
under the aspect of a normative requirement of practical rationality, and
not under the direct application of the background justification, or
independent reason, for the rule.
The promising example, discussed earlier, makes this clear. Suppose
we had a rule for seeing to it that our promises were performed as
intended.53 The reason or background justification for the rule might
well be the welfarist one that we are better off performing our promise
as intended than we would be if we made no such promise at all, and
even if (we anticipate that) actually carrying out that promise makes us
all worse off than we would be if we secured the benefits of making the
promise and did not incur the costs of actually performing it. This
presents us, of course, with a familiar problem. We have already seen
that we might have a particular background justification or reason,
which we can call reason W (for welfare), for intending to carry out a
promise, or (now) having a promising rule, which can also furnish us
with a reason not to follow the rule when the particular situation arises
for carrying out the promise as previously intended. Nevertheless, as a
matter of normative requirement, we should follow, or “simply apply,”
the rule because this is precisely the situation that was anticipated by the
rule and was already accounted for in it. Moreover, we properly
(rationally) follow the rule in the particular case even though there is
(now) some cost in terms of reason W (which provides the background
justification for the rule) in doing so. Thus, it is a mistake to think, as
Schauer does, that, at the point where the rule is to be followed, we are
simply appealing directly to the background justification. On that view,
a view that (here) reduces practical rationality to acting in accordance
with reason W, we would not follow the rule. But we do follow the rule,
and we follow it as a matter of normative requirement. Further, we have
no independent reason for not following the rule, having already
anticipated and accounted for the countervailing consideration in terms
of W within the rule itself.
With the practical significance of a rule now once again secured, we

53. The promising example is discussed both by HART, supra note 37, at 136, and
by Schauer, supra note 42, at 224.
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have only to recognize that in Schauer’s second sort of situation, where
some event occurs that appears to lie within the rule’s linguistic
contours, but which was not anticipated under the reasons that provide
for the rule’s background justification, there is an independent pro tanto
reason for not following the rule. After all, under this more purposeful
(or contentful, reason-based) understanding of the rule, the rule simply
does not apply and there is no normative requirement actually to follow
it. Indeed, there is only an independent reason for not following it, and
for re-formulating the rule (perhaps with a further unless clause) in light
of the new (unanticipated) pro tanto reason (or, perhaps, with a view to
some new balance between new and old pro tanto reasons). Thus, the
combined application of normative requirements and independent
reasons makes sense of Hart’s claim that both rules qua rules and the
defeasibility of rules can sensibly be integrated into a full account of
practical legal rationality. And it also allows us to comprehend the idea,
alluded to at the beginning of this section, that particular cases can,
apparently simultaneously, both determine legal rules and be determined
by them.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this Article I have argued that a full account of practical rationality,
as being comprised of reasons and normative requirements, can make
good sense of rationally following through on commitments rationally
made. Further, it can do so even if, in some circumstances, the balance
of reasons is for not doing what you had reason to choose, intend, or
promise to do. I have tried to suggest that there is much advantage in
this for a rational agent, although it would be a mistake, a rational
mistake, for the agent to let the securing of this advantage be the reason
for doing what she does. In these circumstances, the agent should do
what she has chosen, intended, or promised to do as a matter of
normative requirement, not as a matter of reason. This is not to say, of
course, that the agent should follow through on her prior commitments
in some blind, mechanical way, without a view to new and unanticipated
considerations. That, too, would be practically irrational; normative
requirements are no more the whole of practical rationality than are
reasons. Rather, what she should do is follow through on her rational
commitment, even in the face of countervailing reasons, unless some
new independent reason, not already anticipated and accounted for under
the rule, prompts her to reconsider that commitment.
This suggests that a practically rational decisionmaker, at least in
particular cases, will concern herself less with the substantive reason
behind her prior rational commitment, at least qua reason, and more with
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the reasons that might arise for narrowing or broadening her prior
commitments in light of developing circumstances. In other words, the
practically rational decisionmaker will typically be working only on the
margin of some more general rule adopted for application in the cases,
pressing forward with it in the case unless she can be convinced that the
case is unlike those she had already considered and anticipated under the
rule.54
This, I have also tried to suggest, is precisely the sort of rationality
that is manifested in common law adjudication. Of course, judges will
often have to attend to a purposeful (reason-based) interpretation of the
rules that they seek to apply as a matter of normative requirement.
Otherwise, they would not have a full sense of what the rule really is.
But their purposeful application of the rule is formal, not substantive, the
stuff of normative requirements rather than independent reasons. They
only address independent reasons when they are asked, typically by
litigants, to either broaden or narrow the rule in light of special (novel)
considerations arising in the particular case. In this way, common law
judges act in a rule-based way, although they are not rule-bound. This is
what Hart meant to capture in his idea of defeasible legal rules.
One final cautionary note: while I think that the practical rationality
that is manifested in a system of defeasible legal rules is the sort of
rationality that might prove helpful for understanding why a rational
agent can rationally follow through on commitments rationally made, I
do not mean to suggest that common law adjudication is solving the sort
of problem that plagues the rational choice theorist confronted with the
paradox of backwards induction. That paradox turns on there being a
finite sequence of possible choices and the agent being able to look
ahead to the end of that sequence from which the backwards induction
begins. The common law has no such finite horizon, or at least not one
with such a predictable ending. However, I do mean to suggest that the
rational choice theorist can learn from a close study of the practical
rationality that is manifested in common law adjudication. Armed with
an appreciation of the role that is played by reasons and normative
requirements in practical rationality, the rational choice theorist will be
in a better position to understand and design institutions for rational
behavior more generally.
54. For further discussion of this idea, and how it relates substantive reason to the
formal equality of treating like cases alike, see Bruce Chapman, Chance, Reason, and
the Rule of Law, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 469, 477–89 (2000).
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